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We describe how to device-independently generate a set of quantum states for which unambiguous
state discrimination is not possible. First, we derive a formula that a certain non-signaling black
box must satisfy. Then, we describe how to generate a set of quantum states. Devices for gener-
ating states and possible measurements on the states can be put into a black box. Because this
black box is non-signaling, it satisfies the formula. Using the formula, we prove that unambiguous
state discrimination is not possible for the generated states. Because we did not consider internal
mechanisms but only outcomes, our argument is valid for any (imperfect) devices.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most fundamental properties of quantum
states that differentiates them from classical ones is that
nonorthogonal states cannot be discriminated with cer-
tainty [1, 2]. Unambiguous state discrimination (USD)
[3–5] has an all-versus-nothing nature. If the measure-
ment is successful, states can be discriminated with cer-
tainty. However, the probability that the measurement
fails is non-zero, which is a manifestation of the lack of
certainty.
An intercept-resend attack using USD is an obstacle to
quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols, especially to
the Scarani-Ac´ın-Ribordy-Gisin 2004 protocol [6]. Thus,
it is meaningful to avoid the USD attack. USD is applica-
ble only for linearly independent states [7]. Hence, a way
to avoid the USD attack is to make it certain that the
dimension of states generated is smaller than the number
of states adopted in the protocol. The problem in prac-
tice is that unavoidable imperfection always exist in the
source. Actual states generated deviate from the sup-
posed ideal one. As a result, the dimension of the state
deviates from that of the desired one, which makes the
state vulnerable to USD attack. Here, if combined with
high loss, even a very small imperfection can be danger-
ous for QKD users. Thus, we need a way to avoid the
USD attack even with imperfections.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a method, with
any source and measurement devices, to generate states
for which the USD is impossible. Because the method
works with any source and measurement device, clearly
it also works with an imperfect source and measurement
device. What is guaranteed, however, is only the impossi-
bility of USD. Nothing else, e.g., the identity of generated
states, is guaranteed.
All device-independent quantum information process-
ings so far, e.g., device-independent testing of device
[8], no-signaling QKD [9, 10], and device-independent
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QKD [11], have been based on Bell’s inequality viola-
tion [12]. However, our method is not based on Bell’s
inequality, but on the no-signaling principle. (Commu-
nication scenario similar to the one considered here was
proposed by Herbert [13] and was then applied to de-
rive several bounds in quantum information, including
approximate quantum cloning [14], quantum state dis-
crimination [15, 16], and quantum state estimation [17].)
II. A NO-SIGNALING BLACK BOX
Assume that Alice and Eve, two persons, share a ‘black
box’ with the following properties; The part of the black
box accessible to Alice has a knob that can be in two
different directions. If a binary value i Alice has chosen
is 0 (1), she turns the knob in one (the other) direction.
Then, if she presses a button, the black box gives a binary
outcome j and an outcome k (k = 0, 1, 2, ...), respectively,
for Alice and Eve. Here, we neither know nor care what
happen inside the black box. What we consider are only
the outcomes. Let Pi(j, k) denote joint probability, for
knob choice i, that the outcomes are j and k. Then, we
get [18]
Pi(△, k) = Pi(k|0)Pi(0,△) + Pi(k|1)Pi(1,△). (1)
Here, Pi(j,△) and Pi(△, k) denote the marginal proba-
bilities for Alice and Eve, respectively. (For clarity, we
adopt a notation different from the one widely used in
which the marginal distributions for Alice and Eve are
Pi(j) and Pi(k), respectively.) Pi(k|j) denotes the prob-
ability that Eve gets k if Alice’s outcome is j for the knob
choice i. Note that the marginal probability Pi(j,△) can
directly be estimated by using the outcomes of the black
box for Alice.
The no-signaling principle implies that Eve’s marginal
distribution is independent of the knob choice:
P0(△, k) = P1(△, k). (2)
From Eqs. (1) and (2), we get
P0(k|0)P0(0,△) + P0(k|1)P0(1,△)
= P1(k|0)P1(0,△) + P1(k|1)P1(1,△). (3)
2The condition in Eq. (3) must be satisfied by any non-
signaling black box.
III. HOW TO GENERATE STATES
Assume that each time Alice needs to generate a state
chosen from among four states |0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉 with equal
probability. Here, |0〉 and |1〉 are two mutually orthogo-
nal states and |±〉 = (1/√2)(|0〉 ± |1〉).
As is well known, if Alice can generate an ideal Bell
state and can perform ideal measurements, she can gen-
erate ideal state: Assume Alice has a Bell state
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉A1 |0〉A2 + |1〉A1 |1〉A2), (4)
where A1 and A2 denote two separated parts in Alice’s
laboratory. Assume thatM0 (M1) is a measurement com-
posed of {|0〉〈0|, |1〉〈1|} ({|+〉〈+|, |−〉〈−|}). Alice chooses
a value i (i = 0, 1) with equal probability. She performs
Mi at location A1. Then, at location A2, the four states
are generated with equal probability.
However, because of unavoidable imperfections, the ac-
tually generated state is slightly different from the ideal
Bell state. The imperfect state is denoted by |ψ˜〉. We
also need to assume that the measurements are also im-
perfect. Let us denote the imperfect measurements by
M˜i.
Let us describe how to generate states for which USD
is impossible device-independently. With imperfect de-
vices, Alice does what she did in the ideal case. That is,
she prepares a state |ψ˜〉. She randomly chooses a binary
bit i. She performs a measurement M˜i at location A1. If
she performs M˜0, she gets an outcome between 0 and 1
with a certain corresponding probability p1 and 1 − p1.
When she gets 0 (1), she regards a state at location A2,
whatever it actually is, as a |0〉 (|1〉) state. The imper-
fect states are denoted by |0˜〉 and |1˜〉, correspondingly.
Similarly, if she performs M˜1, she gets an outcome be-
tween 0 and 1 with a certain corresponding probability
p2 and 1 − p2. When she gets 0 (1), she regards a state
at location A2, whatever it actually is, as a |+〉 (|−〉)
state. The imperfect states are denoted by |+˜〉 and |−˜〉,
correspondingly. This way of generating the four states
using an entangled state to hide basis information had
been considered in Ref. 19 in the context of QKD with-
out public announcement of basis [20] and in Ref. 21 in
the context of the effectiveness of the security proof.
IV. USD IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR THE
GENERATED STATES
Now let us argue why the set of the four imperfect
states is not vulnerable to USD in any case. Let us
consider a measurement M by Eve with outcomes k
(k = 0, 1, 2, ...) performed on the imperfect state. Let
us put all components, the state |ψ˜〉, Alice’s measure-
ment M˜i, and Eve’s one M , into a black box. By using
a knob on the black box, Alice can choose between M˜0
and M˜1. Outcomes of the measurements are given by
the black box. Now, we can see that the black box here
is just the one we considered in Section II. We can see
that the marginal probabilities for Alice, Pi(0,△) and
Pi(1,△), are equal to pi and 1−pi, correspondingly. Let
(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), and (1, 1) denote the imperfect states
|0˜〉, |1˜〉, |+˜〉, and |−˜〉, respectively. P [k|(l,m)] is the con-
ditional probability that outcome of M is k if the imper-
fect state is (l,m). We can see that Pl(k|m) is given by
P [k|(l,m)]. Since the black box here is non-signaling, it
satisfies Eq. (3), which is now
p0P [k|(0, 0)] + (1 − p0)P [k|(0, 1)] =
p1P [k|(1, 0)] + (1− p1)P [k|(1, 1)].(5)
Now let us describe why Eq. (5) implies that USD is
not possible for the four states. In order that USD be pos-
sible, all conditional probabilities except for one should
be zero. For example, P [k|(0, 0)] = 1 and P [k|(0, 1)] =
P [k|(1, 0)] = P [k|(1, 1)] = 0 means that if the outcome is
k, the measured state must be (0, 0) by Bayes’s formula.
Clearly, we have
min(p0, 1− p0){P [k|(0, 0)] + P [k|(0, 1)]}
≤ p0P [k|(0, 0)] + (1− p0)P [k|(0, 1)], (6)
where min(p0, 1 − p0) is the minimal value between p0
and 1− p0. Similarly, we obtain
p1P [k|(1, 0)] + (1− p1)P [k|(1, 1)]
≤ max(p1, 1− p1){P [k|(1, 0)] + P [k|(1, 1)]}, (7)
where max(p1, 1 − p1) is the maximal value between p1
and 1− p1. Combining Eqs. (5)-(7), we get
P [k|(1, 0)] + P [k|(1, 1)] ≥
min(p0, 1− p0)
max(p1, 1− p1){P [k|(0, 0)] + P [k|(0, 1)]}. (8)
Similarly, we also obtain
P [k|(0, 0)] + P [k|(0, 1)] ≥
min(p1, 1− p1)
max(p0, 1− p0){P [k|(1, 0)] + P [k|(1, 1)]}. (9)
Using Eqs. (8) and (9), we can derive a bound on the
Eve’s probability to make a correct guess on the identity
of states. Note that Alice’s marginal distributions can be
statistically determined by using the outcomes for Alice.
Let us consider the case when pi = 1/2, as an example.
(The case is obtained when the ideal Bell state was em-
ployed. However, our argument does not depend on how
it was obtained. Our argument is valid as long as pi is
observed to be 1/2.) In this case, Eqs. (8) and (9) give
P [k|(0, 0)] + P [k|(0, 1)] = P [k|(1, 0)] + P [k|(1, 1)]. (10)
Here we can see USD is not possible: for any outcome k,
Eve’s probability to make a correct guess on the identity
of states is bounded by 1/2.
3V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Equations (8) and (9) imply that the more deviated
from 1/2 the pi is, the higher the bound on Eve’s prob-
ability to make a correct guess is. Let us consider an
extreme case when p0 = 0. Now, P [k|(0, 0)] = 1 and
P [k|(0, 1)] = P [k|(1, 0)] = P [k|(1, 1)] = 0 are not ex-
cluded. However, this does not allow USD because the
state (0, 0) is not even generated.
Note that, by the no-signaling principle, Eq. (5) is
satisfied in any case. The state |ψ˜〉 and Alice’s measure-
ment and Eve’s measurement need not even be close to
the ideal ones. Our argument for the impossibility of
USD is still valid for this case. However, the generated
states are not proper for QKD protocols because they
deviate greatly from the ideal ones.
In conclusion, we derived a formula that a certain non-
signaling black box must satisfy. Then, we described how
to generate a set of quantum states. Devices for generat-
ing states and possible measurements on the states can
be put into a black box. Because this black box is non-
signaling, it satisfies the formula. Using the formula,
we proved that USD is not possible for the generated
states. Because we did not consider internal mechanisms
but only outcomes, our argument is valid for any (imper-
fect) devices.
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